Research
Publications
In Defense of Humean Non-Universal Laws (Synthese, 2024) [official version] [unofficial version]
Abstract: In this paper, I raise a novel objection to David Lewis’s Humean account of laws. The objection is that non-universal laws are metaphysically possible, but Lewis’s account cannot accommodate them. I then propose and defend an extension of Lewis’s view that gives us an account of Humean non-universal laws.
Presentations and Conferences
Presentations
Presentations
“Humean Metaphysical Laws and Unification: New Solutions to the Inference Problem and the Problem of Meta-Ground”
Society for the Metaphysics of Science (SMS) Conference, University of Toronto (May 25, 2026)
28th Annual Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference, University of Colorado Boulder (April 3, 2026)
“Non-Universal Laws or Explanation: A Dilemma for the Anti-Humean”
Central American Philosophical Association (APA) Division Meeting, Online (February 27, 2025)
Method, Theory, and Reality Speaker Series, UMass Amherst (February 13, 2025)
“In Defense of Humean Non-Universal Laws”
Method, Theory, and Reality Conference, UMass Amherst (May 6, 2023)
Comments
“Minding Our Business: Why Inference is Still a Problem for Laws of Nature” by Michael Townsen Hicks
Society for the Metaphysics of Science (SMS) Conference, University of Lugano (July 1, 2025)
Other Research
Humeanism and Its Challenges (UMass Amherst, 2023) [link to PDF]
Abstract: In this literature review, I describe Humeanism and Humean supervenience, anti-Humeanism, and challenges to Humeanism. In §1, I describe the Humean view and its motivations. In §2, I describe three anti-Humean views in order to compare anti-Humeanism to Humeanism. In §3, I describe several objections to Humeanism. In §4, I discuss problems that arise for the Humean and anti-Humean views related to chance. Finally, in §5, I discuss a challenge to Humean supervenience from quantum mechanics.
